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                                                                                                      NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-2791
___________
MAXIE SEPANG,
                                                 Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
                                                    Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A079-708-173)
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Eugene Pugliese
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 14, 2010
Before: BARRY, STAPLETON and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed:  April 27, 2010)
_________
 OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Maxie Sepang petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”) from an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his motion to reopen his
immigration proceedings.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for review.
I.
Sepang originally filed for asylum as well; however, his attorney conceded at the1
merits hearing that Sepang was ineligible for asylum because it was well over one year
since he had entered the United States.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B).
2
Sepang, a citizen of Indonesia, entered the United States on a non-immigrant visa in
1994, and stayed longer than permitted.  In April 2003, the government instituted removal
proceedings against Sepang.  Sepang conceded removability and applied for withholding of
removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture.   At a merits hearing, Sepang testified1
that he could not return to Indonesia because the Indonesian government fails to protect
Christians who are attacked by Muslims.  In a decision issued in March 2004, the IJ concluded
that Sepang failed to establish that it was more likely than not that he would either be tortured or
have his life or freedom threatened; the IJ denied Sepang’s applications for relief and ordered
him excluded.  In an order dated August 22, 2005, the BIA affirmed, noting that violence against
Christians in Indonesia takes place in specific regions, and that Sepang could avoid the violence
by moving to parts of Indonesia where Christians are not in danger.  Sepang did not file a petition
for review in this Court.
In October 2005, Sepang, through counsel, filed a motion to reopen on the grounds that
the conditions in Indonesia had changed and alleging legal error in the IJ and BIA decisions.  The
BIA construed the motion as a motion to reconsider and rejected it as time barred.  In December
2005, Sepang filed a second motion to reconsider the BIA’s denial of his earlier motion to
reopen.  Because Sepang submitted additional evidence regarding changed country conditions in
Indonesia with his motion, the BIA construed the motion as a motion to reopen.  The BIA
concluded that the changed circumstances did not warrant reopening.  In August 2006, Sepang,
3acting pro se, filed a third motion to reopen.  Sepang argued that he was a member of an
organization that had submitted special legislation to Congress that, if passed, would grant
Sepang permanent residency.  The BIA again denied the motion, rejecting it as time and number
barred.
Sepang returned to the BIA in January 2009 with a fourth motion to reopen, this time
seeking equitable tolling of the filing restrictions because of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Sepang asserted that the attorney who had represented him during his initial appearance before
the IJ and the BIA, and during his first two motions to reopen, had not diligently pursued an
asylum claim and failed to present evidence about country conditions.  Additionally, he claimed
that his attorney had improperly filed motions to reopen and reconsider.  Given these
circumstances, Sepang requested that the BIA reopen his proceedings.  The BIA again denied the
motion as time and number barred, noting that equitable tolling was not available as Sepang did
not comply with the procedural requirements for filing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
as set forth in Matter of Lozada, 191 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988).  The BIA further found that,
since the IJ’s 2003 decision, conditions in Indonesia had not changed to the extent that would
warrant reopening Sepang’s case.  Sepang filed a timely petition for review.
II.
We have jurisdiction over the petition for review pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  We
review the BIA’s findings of fact for substantial evidence and the denial of the motion to reopen
for abuse of discretion.  See Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 170 (3d Cir. 2002).  The BIA’s
decision is entitled to “broad deference.”  Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 409 (3d Cir.
2003).  Thus, in order to succeed on the petition for review, Sepang must show that the BIA’s
4discretionary decision was arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.  See Tipu v. INS, 20 F.3d 580,
582 (3d Cir. 1994) (quotation omitted).  Sepang has failed to make such a showing.
III.
In the interest of finality, a motion to reopen generally “shall be filed within 90 days of
the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal.”  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); see
also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) (an alien may file one motion to reopen).  In this case, Sepang
filed his fourth motion to reopen over three years after the BIA’s decision.  Under some
circumstances, equitable tolling is available for a motion to reopen.  See Borges v. Gonzales, 402
F.3d 398, 406 (3d Cir. 2005).  Sepang alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, which can serve
as a basis for equitable tolling, if substantiated, and if accompanied by a showing of due
diligence.  See Mahmood v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 248, 252 (3d Cir. 2005).  However, to rely on an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim to toll a time limit, the BIA requires an alien to comply
with the procedural requirements of Lozada, a requirement that we have held to be reasonable. 
Lu v. Ashcroft, 259 F.3d 127, 129 (3d Cir. 2001).  Sepang did not include a detailed statement
setting forth what his attorney agreed to do, nor did he indicate that he had given his attorney an
opportunity to respond to these charges.  Furthermore, he did not show that he had reported his
attorney for disciplinary action.  In short, Sepang did not comply with any of the Lozada
requirements.  See Lozada, 19 I. & N. at 639.
Because Sepang’s motion was untimely, his motion had to be based on changed country
conditions in Indonesia.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (90 day time limitation does not apply if
the alien seeks reopening “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality .
. .  if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or
5presented at the previous hearing.”) We conclude, however, that the BIA did not abuse its
discretion in denying his untimely motion to reopen because Sepang did not make the required
showing.  Sepang based his allegation of changed circumstances arising in Indonesia, and his
assertion that his evidence was material to his claim of persecution, on the State Department
International Freedom Reports for 2004 and 2007.  Neither of the Reports show that conditions
of widespread persecution against Christians in Indonesia have changed since Sepang’s
immigration hearing in 2004 such to warrant reopening.  See Sioe Tjen Wong v. Att’y Gen., 539
F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2008).  Thus, Sepang has not shown the BIA’s decision to deny his
motion to reopen was arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.
For the above reasons, we will deny the petition for review.
